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Gurven and Hill (2009) ask, “Why do men hunt?” As they
say, “The observation that men hunt and women gather sup-
ported the simplistic view of marriage as a cooperative en-
terprise. Greater sophistication suggests that males may often
be motivated by mating and status rather than offspring in-
vestment” (p. 60). We agree (e.g., Hawkes 1990, 1991; Hawkes
et al. 1991, 2001a, 2001b). This is the revision we first pro-
posed nearly 20 years ago (Hawkes 1990) and have elaborated
several times since. Having endorsed our point, Gurven and
Hill then reject it, expressing continuing confidence in the
idea that “men’s food production efforts are mainly motivated
by a concern for familial welfare” (p. 68). Their rejection of
our argument and related reaffirmation of conventional wis-
dom stem from a misunderstanding of data from the Para-
guayan Ache and Tanzanian Hadza and a failure to appreciate
the importance of other sources of information. We elaborate
this critique on four key points.
Dietary Importance of Men’s Hunting
Gurven and Hill (2009:52–53) imply that our previous
work inappropriately discounted the contribution of men’s
hunting to Ache and Hadza diets. On the contrary, we have
repeatedly underscored its significance (e.g., for the Ache,
Hawkes 1987, 1990, 1991 and Hawkes et al. 1982; for the
Ache and other cases, Hawkes 1993 and Hawkes and Bird
2002; and for the Hadza, Hawkes et al. 1991, 1997, 2001a,
2001b). In the case of the Hadza, our data from a total of
256 days of observation (1985–1988) show that men’s big-
game hunting delivered an average of 0.7 kg/consumer/day
(live weight) to the residents of camps we observed. We affirm
that men’s hunting is a major component of group subsistence
in this and other cases, including the Ache.
Men’s Hunting and Familial Welfare
Group-level averages are one thing; family provisioning is
another. The question of men’s foraging goals arose for the
Ache when analysis of a large data set on food consumption
during long-distance foraging treks revealed two things. First,
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some food types were more widely shared than others (Kaplan
and Hill 1985), variation that was independent of the sex of
the acquirer (Hawkes 1991). Second, men specialized in ac-
quiring the foods for which the smallest fraction went to
members of their own nuclear families (Hawkes 1990, 1991;
Kaplan and Hill 1985). Quantitative analyses showed that
Ache men would earn more for their own households by
targeting a different suite of resources, focusing on those less
widely shared, notably palm starch (Hawkes 1990, 1991; Hill
et al. 1987). Something beyond family provisioning was
needed to explain men’s work.
Gurven and Hill (2009:52) now report new Ache data
amending previous estimates of acquisition rates for palm
starch and hunting. The revised figures are 850–1,200
( ) kcal/h for palm starch, 830 kcal/h for hunt-meanp 1,050
ing. Since these numbers nearly overlap, Gurven and Hill
conclude that our previous inference that men would earn
higher overall rates by including palm starch in the resource
array they routinely exploit is refuted. Yet, if the question is
family provisioning, the distinction between acquisition rate
and “take-home” fraction challenges that claim. The sharing
data that Hill himself analyzed (Kaplan and Hill 1985) show
that nuclear family members of the acquirer got 30% of the
palm starch. Thus the family income rate was ∼300 kcal/h.
For items acquired by hunting, family members got 5%–11%,
yielding a family income rate of 67–91 kcal/h (Kaplan and
Hill 1985). Consistent attention to hunting, despite the op-
portunity costs, points to a concern for something other than
family provisioning.
Gurven and Hill’s focus on the overall average yield from
big-game hunting among the Hadza similarly ignores issues
related to the amount, value, and reliability of returns that
actually reach the hunter’s family. Attention to variance and
distribution is not dismissal of the importance of hunting but
reveals that concerns aside from family provisioning are
needed to explain it. Over our 2,072 hunter-day observation
record, individual Hadza men succeeded in acquiring a large
animal carcass by hunting or scavenging on only 1 hunter-
day in 30, a success rate of 3% (Hawkes et al. 1991, 2001b).
For prey weighing !180 kg (ca. 68% of all recorded large
carcasses taken), hunters’ household share averaged just 5%
of total meat weight; for larger prey (mainly zebra), it was
roughly 10% (Hawkes et al. 2001a). Gurven and Hill (2009:
53) remark on the nutritional importance of fat from these
carcasses, yet African ungulates are notoriously lean. More-
over, easily processed sources of fat (bovid long-bone marrow,
zebra head cavity contents) were frequently stripped out and
eaten by hunters and members of the carrying party at the
point of carcass acquisition, where members of the hunter’s
family were not consistently present, his younger children
rarely so (O’Connell et al. 1988, 1990, 1992). Certain fat-rich
organs were routinely reserved for consumption by adult men
only. As it happened, hunters and their families actually lost
weight in the single season where hunting success and related
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amounts of meat eating were unusually high (Hawkes et al.
1997), a finding that might have been predicted from knowl-
edge of the cost of protein metabolism (e.g., Speth and Spiel-
man 1983).
Other opportunities that might better serve hunters’ house-
hold nutritional needs were certainly available. A small-game
hunting and trapping experiment conducted with a subset of
the same men noted above and spanning 102 hunter-days
yielded a positive outcome on one of every three of those
days (Hawkes et al. 1991). The experiment allowed us to use
the prey model from foraging theory (Charnov 1976; Stephens
and Krebs 1986) to determine whether hunters were maxi-
mizing their return rates by ignoring small animals. When
the assumptions of that model are met, a hunter maximizes
his mean rate of gain by pursuing all resources that have
profitabilities higher than the average rate available from con-
tinuing to search for and handle higher-ranked prey. Profit-
ability, here defined as the expected rate of gain after en-
counter, is the basis for ranking prey types. Because we were
interested in family income rates, we calculated both the av-
erage rate for big-game hunting (which includes the time
spent in search) and the profitability for small animals (which
does not) by adjusting for the fraction expected to go to the
hunter’s household. Since family income profitabilities for
small animals are higher than the overall family income rate
for searching for and taking big game, hunters would increase
their family income rate by taking small animals as well as
large whenever they are encountered (Hawkes et al. 1991,
2001b).
Hunters in our 1985–1988 data set rarely pursued the small
game they encountered on most of the 75 hunting trips we
monitored via focal-person follows, and they never devoted
more than 5 minutes or so to the effort, successful or not,
before resuming the search for larger prey. As in the case of
the Ache, consistent disregard of opportunities that would
net higher family incomes does not support the notion that
Hadza hunters’ prey selection, distribution, and consumption
patterns favor familial welfare.
Contingent Sharing?
Ache and Hadza both share meat widely. Along with others
(notably Woodburn 1998), we have disputed the assumption
that Hadza meat sharing is exchange. Not only the hunter
but also many others pursue entitlement to the meat. As we
said in 2001 (Hawkes et al. 2001a),
Once a carcass was acquired, news spread quickly. The lo-
cation of a carcass was pinpointed by word of mouth and
also by circling vultures and, at night, the call of lions and
hyenas. Not only those tracking the animal but often other
men, women, and children converged on a kill site
(O’Connell et al. 1988, p. 117).
The style of interaction at kill sites exemplifies what Pe-
terson (1993) called “demand sharing.” Arguments over
shares and share size are not uncommon; claims often take
the form, “Where’s mine?” . . . Instead of a set of exchanges
with the hunter, the process of distribution is more like
appropriation from the public domain. . . . The style con-
trasts, for example, with the manners evident among the
Ache . . . who are generally much more soft-spoken. . . .
Food sharing etiquette is strikingly different in the two cases.
But some features of the distribution process are similar.
Not only is meat very widely shared among the Ache . . .
with no bias in the shares to better hunters or their wives
and children; but, as with the Hadza, hunters play no role
in meat distributions (Hill and Kaplan 1988, Kaplan et al.
1990). Usually an older Ache man takes on the final carving
of cooked meat, and all watch as he distributes shares. Ob-
servers frequently criticize portion size and call for adjust-
ments. Once others know of a hunter’s kill, he is in no
position to choose who gets meat or how much (p. 131).
Gurven and Hill (2009:53–54) dispute our assessment:
A recent comprehensive review shows little support for the
notion that hunters do not (or cannot) influence resource
distributions or that meat is unconditionally shared (Gurven
2004). Empirical evidence does not support the assertion
that hunted prey are undefendable public goods. . . . Indeed,
a hunter’s nuclear family obtains more from his kill than
do other families in all sharing studies except those among
the Ache during forest treks.
Gurven and Hill note (2009:54) that our Hadza analysis
reports “no relationship between the total amount of meat a
hunter provides to all others and the amounts received in
return from all others, but this does not test contingency.
. . . Our reanalysis does show significant contingency for meat
transfers among pairs of Hadza hunters” (Gurven 2004).
On the contrary, Gurven’s reanalysis does not demonstrate
that men get shares in exchange for shares they have given
to other men. The correlation he reports is due to two var-
iables: some men were observed more often both as claimants
and as successful hunters; some men have higher overall hunt-
ing success rates. As to the first of these, our observation
window changed as study camps moved and as people arrived
or left particular camps. Men were observed intermittently,
some on more days than others. Men observed over more
days were more likely to be recorded making a kill. They were
also more likely to be observed getting a share from another’s
kill. A correlation between dyads in the amount of meat each
took from kills of the other emerges entirely from observation
bias. We discussed the analytical problem at the time and
noted that changing camp compositions are an inherent fea-
ture of Hadza life. This is one of the reasons that exchange
notions are poorly suited to explain the distributions of meat
(Hawkes et al. 2001a:132–133):
We have focused on the hypothesis that hunters are ex-
changing meat-now for meat-later because it underlies the
long held notion that the risky business of hunting supplies
the basic motivation for human social interdependence (e.g.,
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Figure 1. Reanalysis of Hadza household meat shares reported
in Hawkes et al. (2001a) similar to that of Gurven (2004). Units
are the total kilograms of meat that arrived at one man’s house-
hold from kills of another man in the sample of large-animal
kills for which we weighed all household shares. The positive
correlation depends on the circled points (see text).
Figure 2. Deterministic model showing the correlation between
the shares that hunter A gets from the kills of hunter B and those
that B gets from the kills of A. All residents are assumed to take
equal shares and to have the same success rate. They differ only
in their probability of residence in the observation camp. The
perfect correlation is entirely due to that observation bias, not
repayment or contingent sharing.
Cosmides and Tooby, 1992). That is the hypothesis that gives
rise to the characterization of hunters “storing meat in the
bellies of their neighbors” (e.g., Pinker, 1997). Hypotheses
other than meat-for-meat exchanges have also been sug-
gested. Hunters might, for example, trade shares for other
goods and services (Kaplan and Hill, 1985; Winterhalder,
1986). The property rights question [that we count against
exchange assumptions] is (perhaps usefully) assumed away
in this hypothesis. Formidable accounting problems remain.
Ever-changing scores in different currencies, not all readily
divisible, require daunting feats of coordinated calibration.
And, as laid out by Trivers (1971), self-interested actors
should often have conflicting views of who is in arrears to
whom and how much.
Figure 1 shows an analysis of our Hadza household meat
share sample similar to the one Gurven (2004) reported. For
pairs to be eligible for this analysis, each member must have
been present when the other killed a big animal, so only a
subset of pairs can be used for this test (a constraint that
Gurven did not apply). The positive correlation for the 15
relevant pairs depends entirely on the two circled points, es-
pecially the high outlier in the upper right corner of the figure
and also the point below it and just to the right. Each of the
two pairs includes the man we most often camped with (127
days), more than half again as many days as any other man.
The other pair members are the two men whose big-animal
success rates measured as prey/day during our 1985–1986
observations were by far the highest, both 0.12/prey/day com-
pared to 0.07 prey/day for the man with the next highest
success rate. To assess Gurven’s (2004) claim, repeated here
by Gurven and Hill’s (2009) contention that the correlation
indicates contingent transfers (men getting shares in return
for shares given), we analyze some simple models to further
clarify the biases and then return to the observations
themselves.
Figure 2 shows that just a difference in the number of days
observed can result in a perfect correlation between the trans-
fers from one man’s kills to the other and their reciprocal.
In the model detailed in the associated table, there is no
exchange. All resident men claim equal shares from the kills
of other men. How often A is observed to claim a share from
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Figure 3. Deterministic model showing the correlation between
shares that hunter A gets from the kills of hunter B and those
that B gets from the kills of A. As in figure 2, resident hunters
are assumed to take equal shares. In this case they do not differ
in their frequency of days in the observation camp; they differ
only in their success rates. As in figure 2, the substantial cor-
relation is not due to repayment or contingent sharing.
B depends on how often B is in the observation camp and
procures a large carcass with A also present. In the upper
panel of the table, column I identifies five hunters. Column
II lists the fraction of days each is resident in the observation
camp. Their success rates, column III, are assumed to be the
same. The product of a hunter’s success rate (col. III) and
the fraction of days he is observed (col. II) is the frequency
of kills he gets while resident in the observation camp, column
IV. In the lower panel, columns V and VI identify the hunters
playing A and B in each pair. Column VII is the chance that
B kills while residing in the camp (col. IV entry for the hunter
playing B) times the chance that A is also resident (col. II
entry for the hunter playing A). Column VIII is the value
calculated for A’s kills while resident times the chance that B
is present. The figure plots the correlation between the fre-
quency of shares that A gets from the kills of B (col. VII)
with the frequency of shares that B gets from the kills of A
(col. IX). It would be an error to read this perfect correlation
as evidence of contingency.
The model in figure 3 also assumes no exchange. Men claim
equal shares from every kill. In this case there is no difference
in the chance that hunters are observed, but hunters differ
in their success rates. Column I lists the hunters, column II
their success rates, and column III the pairs (which hunter
plays A, which plays B). The frequency of B’s shares from the
kills of A depends on the frequency of A’s kills, and the
frequency of A’s shares from the kills of B depends on the
frequency of B’s kills. Column IV lists the former (the entry
for A in col. II); column V lists the latter (the entry for B in
col. II). The figure plots the relationship between columns IV
and V. Here the correlation is far from perfect but still
strong—stronger than the correlation that Gurven (2004) re-
ported for his reanalysis of our Hadza data. Again, it would
be an error to assume the correlation is evidence of
contingency.
The simple deterministic models of figures 2 and 3 do not
allow for stochastic variation, so we created simulations in
which both the frequency of observations and the rates of
hunting success were randomly drawn from distributions de-
signed to approximate the observed values. The models ac-
counted for the amount of meat that B took from the kills
of A as a function of the number of days each individual was
observed, the hunters’ respective success rates, and/or the
amount of meat that A took from kills of B. We compared
the goodness of fit of 10 single and multivariate models using
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike 1974). The fit
of models including days of observation and success rates
were consistently highly ranked, showing that even when ran-
dom variation is added, these biases remain.
After comparing the models with simulated data, we com-
pared (again via AIC) how well a similar set of models fit the
observed data. When we kept the extreme outlier in the upper
right-hand corner of figure 1, models that included a variable
for kilograms of meat that A took from kills by B fit better
than those that did not. After removing the outlier, the best-
fitting models predicted the amount of meat taken by B from
A’s kills as a function of days observed. These models did not
include a variable for amount A took from B’s kills.
The deterministic models, the stochastic simulations, and
the models fit to the observed data are further evidence against
Gurven’s (2004) claim, repeated by Gurven and Hill (2009),
that Hadza meat sharing is exchange. The models caution
against the assumption that pairwise correlations are, by
themselves, evidence of contingent sharing.
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What’s the Question?
Gurven and Hill are clearly of two minds about the goal(s)
of men’s hunting, affirming in some places their continuing
confidence in the idea that men’s hunting is family provi-
sioning and elsewhere conceding that other considerations,
mating and status among them, may sometimes be more
important. Data for Ache in the forest and Hadza data re-
ported so far exemplify the latter, as do other data sets that
Gurven and Hill scarcely mention, notably those by Bird and
Bliege Bird (2010), Bliege Bird (1999, 2007), and Bliege Bird
and Bird (2008), as well others discussed by Hawkes and
Bliege Bird (2002).
We agree that interpretations and analyses should always
be carefully scrutinized. In spite of our longstanding skepti-
cism about claims of contingent sharing (reinforced by con-
sideration of Gurven’s [2004] analysis of our Hadza data),
the burden of evidence so far suggests variation in men’s
hunting goals among and within ethnographic cases. Goals
for Ache men may differ between the forest and the settle-
ment. They may differ situationally for Hadza men as well.
In Hadza meat-sharing data collected recently by Wood and
Marlowe (2007), 45% of the meat from large game went to
the hunter’s family, an average that is more than the single
largest share (39%) to a hunter’s own family in our sample.
Our household sharing sample is small. Wood’s observations
will greatly expand the Hadza data set, perhaps allowing tests
of hypotheses about variation in prey size, camp size, fre-
quency and timing of kills, or other ecological variables that
might explain the difference.
We agree with Gurven and Hill’s (2009:53) observation that
“research is needed to determine how often men pursue for-
aging strategies that are suboptimal for familial provisioning”
and welcome their help toward recognizing and explaining
the variation. Rather than assuming only one goal to be the
real one and discounting or ignoring data that challenge it,
we should be primed by both theoretical and empirical work
to expect tension among men’s foraging goals, with the em-
phasis changing as trade-offs vary. Explaining the variability
should be the task at hand.
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